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ABSTRACT 
The “upper echelon” literature has mainly produced static empirical studies on the 
impact of top management team composition on organizational outcomes, ignoring 
the dynamics of industrial demography. Organizational ecology explicitly studied the 
dynamics of organizational diversity at the population level, however largely ignoring 
how the entry and exit of executives shapes organizational diversity over time. In this 
paper, we try to integrate both streams of demography research and develop a multi-
level behavioral theory of organizational diversity, linking selection processes at both 
levels of analysis. The behavioral mechanism connecting the two levels of analysis is 
the stylized empirical fact that small groups, including top management teams, 
routinely reproduce their demographic characteristics over time. We argue that, under 
certain conditions, the potent forces of team homogenization co-evolve with those of 
population-level selection to sustain between-firm diversity. 
  
 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important research questions in the field of organization sciences is 
why some organizations are successful, whilst other organizations linger or fail. 
Different strands of research tend to predominantly attribute the causes of the fate of 
organizations either to the external environment in which organizations operate or to 
the features of their internal functioning. Most organization theories can be put on a 
continuum ranging from macro to micro with respect to their underlying focus. At the 
macro side, organizational ecology (OE) has flourished ever since the publication of 
Hannan and Freeman’s seminal 1977 paper. Given that organizations require reliable 
routines to survive, OE-researchers have systematically analyzed the vital (i.e., 
founding, change and mortality) rates of organizations as the main drivers of change 
and of diversity within organizational populations. This has cumulated into an 
impressive body of knowledge and well-established theory fragments, which has 
recently been summarized by Carroll and Hannan (2000). Heavily relying on the 
concept of organizational inertia, ecologists have focused on cycles of variation, 
selection and retention at the population level, often making abstraction from what 
happens inside the organization. 
 At the other end of the continuum, more recent streams (re)stress that people 
should more prominently picture in theories of organizations as they are the “guts” of 
formal organizations (Stinchcombe, 1997: 17-18; see also, e.g., Pennings, Lee & van 
Witteloostuijn, 1998; Haveman, 2000). Especially, Pfeffer (1983) and Hambrick and 
Mason (1984), departing from a behavioral standpoint, emphasized that organizational 
actions are history-dependent and based on routines. Because individuals enact 
routines, it becomes central to study managers’ demographic profiles since their 
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characteristics are presumed to be associated with specific psychological dispositions 
and subsequent strategic choices (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). The argument is 
that organizations are, to a certain extent, a reflection of the characteristics of their 
(upper echelon) members and/or the distribution of their members’ traits. These 
researchers inspired many scholars to empirically investigate the impact of the 
demographic composition of (groups in) organizations (especially top management 
teams) with respect to dimensions such as tenure, gender, ethnic background and age 
on a myriad of organizational outcomes. The focus generally is on the impact of the 
mean and the spread (i.e., diversity) of these characteristics on criterion variables such 
as turnover, innovation, diversification, and organizational performance (Boone, van 
Olffen & van Witteloostuijn, 2005). The potential importance of these contributions 
should not be underestimated as “they put the individual back into the predominantly 
macro-level organization theory” (Sørensen, 1999a).  
However, although many findings of this young research field are very 
encouraging, a review shows that the results are not very conclusive and in some 
instances even contradictory (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998; Boone et al., 2005). One 
reason for this might be that organizations in these studies are treated as isolated 
entities that do not compete for human capital on input markets. Similarly, the 
consequences of within-firm organizational demography for between-firm 
competition and interaction are not explored (but see Sørensen, 1999a; Wezel, Cattani 
& Pennings, 2005). We argue that in order to advance organizational demography 
research we need to develop a dynamic theory in which micro (team) selection 
processes are integrated into macro (population) ones and vice versa (see also Baum 
& Singh, 1994a; Haveman & Cohen, 1994; March, 1994; Haveman, 1995). As 
Haveman (2000) stressed, different phenomena at different levels of analysis can be 
 3
“understood as parts of a single, broad evolutionary system. Only when we analyze 
the whole system will we come to grasp the interdependencies among these 
phenomena” (Haveman, 2000: 482). We do so by applying the principles of variation, 
selection and retention (Campbell, 1969) at the top management team level of analysis 
through the lens of OE, with the goal of understanding the dynamics of populations of 
organizations.  
 In building our argument, we will try to bring together many disparate pieces 
of literature, ranging from organizational behavior (attraction, selection and attrition 
processes: Schneider, 1987), via evolutionary theory and sociology (homophily: 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001; Ruef, Aldrich & Carter, 2003), to 
organizational ecology (Darwinian population-level selection: Carroll & Hannan, 
2000) and market-partitioning theory (multi-form co-evolution: Carroll, 1985), as well 
as organizational demography and upper-echelon theory (top management team 
composition: Pfeffer, 1983; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). We will also borrow from 
and build on McPherson’s ecological theory of affiliation in voluntary organizations 
(McPherson, 1983) and Sørensen's (1999a) first attempt to develop a dynamic inter-
firm approach to top management team composition. So, on the one hand, we 
contribute to the predominantly “static” top management team literature by 
elaborating a dynamic theory of team composition and its implications, in interaction 
with higher-level processes. Moreover, on the other hand, we contribute to 
organizational ecology by explicitly putting the individual back into macro-level 
population dynamics (cf. Pennings et al., 1998; Wezel et al., 2005). In particular, we 
aim at shedding light on the role of managerial turnover for the maintenance of those 
routines on which selection operates (Baum & Singh, 1994a; Miner, 1994). 
Ultimately, therefore, this paper deals with an old classical tension in the social 
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sciences between individual agency and the dominating pressure of social aggregates 
(Haveman, 2000).  
  
MICRO-LEVEL HOMOSOCIAL REPRODUCTION 
Drive toward homogeneity 
A pervasive fact in social life is that social groups (including top management teams 
and organizations) are not random samples of people (McPherson, Popielarz & 
Drobnic, 1992). Instead, people are systematically sorted into groups whose members 
have similar sociodemographic characteristics. Blau (1977) convincingly argued that 
demographic characteristics influence social interaction: social interaction is more 
likely to occur between people who are similar with respect to demographic features 
(McPherson et al., 1992 & 2001). Indeed, evidence shows that “distances along 
sociodemographic dimensions translate into probability of contact between 
individuals for almost all kinds of messages passing through the system, whether the 
messages are money, sociation, attitudes, group formation, or the like” (McPherson et 
al., 1992: 155). This self-reinforcing relationship between similarity and connection is 
also known as the ‘homophily principle’.  
       With respect to group formation, research shows that (groups in) organizations 
differentiate by carving out niches in social space. The result is that members of 
groups are, on average, more similar to each other than to members of other groups. 
McPherson and colleagues (McPherson, 1983; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987; 
McPherson et al., 1992; McPherson & Rotolo, 1996), building on the seminal work of 
Blau (1977), systematically studied a large variety of voluntary organizations, ranging 
from sport clubs to churches in the U.S. They found that in the course of competition 
for members, these organizations specialize in specific local regions of 
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sociodemographic space – the so-called Blau space (McPherson et al., 1992). When 
mapping voluntary organizations onto the demographic dimensions of the member’s 
occupation and education level, they observe that the means in both dimensions differ 
between organizations and that the within-firm standard deviations are much smaller 
than a random sample of individuals would produce. 
Similar compositional differences between organizations in the for-profit 
sector were reported in the organizational behavior literature. Interestingly, here 
researchers did not focus on demographics, but rather on aspects of member 
personality. For instance, Schneider, Smith, Taylor & Fleenor (1998) used the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator to assess the personality of almost 13,000 managers from 142 
organizations, representing a broad cross-sample of U.S. industries. Their key finding 
is that a substantial part of personality variation can be explained by organizational 
membership. In addition, nested models of organizations within industries revealed 
remarkable regularities, demonstrating that sorting does not only occur across 
populations (as in the studies of McPherson and colleagues), but also between 
organizations belonging to the same population. This underscores that “homophily is 
a powerful force of group homogeneity” (McPherson et al., 1992: 156).  
The same homophily principle also applies to small groups and management 
teams. Ruef, Aldrich and Carter (2003) analyzed a unique representative cross-
sectional sample of 816 organizational founding teams from the U.S. population, and 
found that homophily and network constraints based on strong ties were the most 
important forces driving founding team composition. This appeared to be the case not 
only for ascriptive characteristics such as gender and ethnicity, but also for achieved 
characteristics. Ruef et al. (2003: 217) conclude that “even in a situation where we 
might reasonably expect stringent economic rationality to prevail – and thus lead to 
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choice based on the functional diversification of achieved characteristics – we find 
that team composition is driven by similarity not differences.”  
The above examples make clear that important cross-sectional differences in 
the demographic composition of groups can be observed, and that homophily and 
group homogeneity are two sides of the same coin. However, they do not fully explain 
how these regularities unfold. In order to be able to fully appreciate the potential 
consequences of homophily and group composition in an organizational context, one 
therefore also needs to understand where demographic homogeneity (or, for that 
matter, diversity) comes from in the first place (Lawrence, 1997; Pfeffer, 1997; Hinds 
et al., 2000), as well as the determinants of the evolution of demographic composition 
(Ruef et al., 2003; Boone, van Olffen, van Witteloostuijn & De Brabander, 2004).  
 
Dynamic models of group composition 
Two different theoretical accounts have been offered in the past to explain the 
dynamics of group composition: McPherson’s ecology of affiliation (McPherson, 
1983; McPherson et al., 1992) and Schneider’s attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) 
theory (Schneider, 1987). Both theories propose a Darwinian mechanism of 
systematic variation, selection and retention of members in groups. Moreover, both 
theories agree that groups have the tendency to reproduce themselves by the selective 
recruitment of similar people in the group and by facilitating the turnover of dissimilar 
people, a directional selection process labeled “homosocial reproduction” by Kanter 
(1977). These two theories offer seemingly different but complementary explanations 
on the mechanisms underlying the unfolding of group homophily. 
McPherson’s (macro-)sociological theory, building on Blau’s Inequality and 
Heterogeneity (1977), stresses the importance of network ties associated with the 
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position of individuals in sociodemograhic space. In this view, social structure, via its 
impact on network ties, drives the selective entry and exit of members into and out of 
groups. As people tend to develop network ties with other people sharing similar 
sociodemographic characteristics, people joining to form groups are relatively similar. 
This similarity is perpetuated due to conservative, selective recruitment of new 
members (McPherson et al., 1992; Popielarz & McPherson, 1995). In a similar vein, 
Feld (1992) argued that the social homogeneity of organizational foci strongly 
enhances the formation of homophilous network ties, and found that these foci 
produced ties that were twice as homogeneous as would be expected by chance. So, 
selective recruitment implies selection via social contact.1 
Selective recruitment is reinforced by the principle that members who are 
atypical of the group will leave the group first (the niche-edge hypothesis), especially 
when groups are subject to competition from other groups (Popielarz & McPherson, 
1995). The putative reason is that demographic dissimilarity from group members acts 
as a centrifugal force because homophily implies that atypical members have more 
external ties to non-members and are less closely tied to fellow group members 
(Popielarz & McPherson, 1995). Empirical research on voluntary organizations 
indeed suggests (1) that entry and exit of group members depend upon the number 
and strength of social network ties that connect group members to each other and to 
non-members (McPherson et al., 1992), and (2) that atypical members will leave the 
group first (Popielarz & McPherson, 1995). McPherson et al. (1992) claim that 
homophily mainly follows from social structure, and not from human agency (cf. 
Popielarz & McPherson, 1995). Group formation is determined by general constraints 
in the social network with respect to logically possible choices, rather than by 
“individual utilities or imputed production functions” that guide our choices to join 
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and stay in groups (McPherson & Ranger-Moore, 1991: 38). That is, an individual’s 
position in the social structure determines her or his opportunity set. 
 The attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) theory of Schneider (1987) offers a 
complementary view. ASA theory summarizes many different strands of research in 
the field of organizational behavior (see also Schneider, Goldstein & Smith, 1995), 
stressing the importance of human agency and choice in producing homophily.2 
Although the original model focused on “soft” people characteristics such as attitudes 
and personality, it also applies to demographics (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996; Boone et al., 2004).3 The ASA model outlines the forces operating to 
restrict organizational diversity in members’ characteristics, producing so-called trait 
homogenization (Schaubroeck, Ganster & Jones, 1998). That is, organizations move 
toward member homogeneity because individuals are attracted to, selected by, and 
stay with organizations that suit their personality characteristics (Schaubroeck et al., 
1998). ASA theory provides a behavioral rather than a structural (i.e., network ties) 
account of the dynamics of homosocial team reproduction. 
 Why would people prefer to associate or to work with similar ‘alter egos’? 
Several related reasons can be offered (see also Westhpal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996; Boone et al., 2004). First, there is ample evidence in social 
psychology that similarity on a salient dimension enhances (dyadic) interpersonal 
attraction (for a review, see Huston & Levinger, 1978). Although many underlying 
mechanisms have been proposed, theory and evidence suggest that this similarity – 
attraction response is likely to be deeply rooted in human beings as it is directly 
reinforced by positive affectivity (Byrne, 1971; Clore & Byrne, 1974). Second, self-
categorization theory posits that people derive self-esteem and self-identity from 
perceived group membership. As demographic similarity provides a salient basis for 
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group membership, people may seek to construct or maintain homogeneous groups in 
order to sustain or enhance their self-esteem and identity (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). 
Third, Hogg and Mullin (1999) argue that reducing uncertainty is a primary individual 
motivator or “fundamental need” guiding behavior. Given that similarity enhances the 
(perceived) predictability of the behavior of others, the psychological need for 
stability strongly motivates people to reduce uncertainty by forming homogeneous 
groups (see also Hinds et al., 2000). 
 A final set of reasons follow from the fact that groups in most cases (e.g., in 
organizations) compete with other groups for resources or are nested in higher-order 
groupings (Baum & Singh, 1994a; Campbell, 1994). It is well established that inter-
group competition alters behavior of members in important ways (an insight dating 
back to, at least, the Robber’s cave experiments of Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & 
Sherif, 1961; see also LeVine & Campbell, 1972). For instance, it is a stylized fact 
that people are more likely to cooperate in a social dilemma when it is embedded in 
the context of inter-group conflict (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994;  Bornstein, 2003). 
The reason for this is that from the standpoint of the individual such behavior 
increases the survival chances of the group. However, within-group cooperation is 
only sustainable when people trust each other and / or deviance from reciprocity can 
easily be monitored and sanctioned (Campbell, 1994; van Witteloostuijn, 2003). It is 
likely that group homogeneity facilitates trust and reciprocal altruism in face-to-face 
groups (Ruef et al., 2003; Boone et al., 2004) – clique selfishness in Campbell’s 
(1994) words. As he (1994: 28) puts it: “All group uniformities on trait – specifically 
neutral features – would be useful signs in such a reciprocal altruistic pact.” 
 Closely related to this, group homogeneity might also enhance group survival 
because of sociopolitical reasons. That is, homogeneity is likely to increase a group’s 
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power to control competition between groups in nested settings. For instance, top 
managers might prefer to hire and promote people in the top management team who 
are similar – e.g., having the same functional background and sharing the same 
strategic preferences – to perpetuate and institutionalize their managerial power. At 
the same time, similarity facilitates communication within a team, and diminishes the 
likelihood of conflict and within-team power struggles (Pfeffer, 1983; Boone, van 
Olffen & van Witteloostuijn, 1998).4 At the organization level, Beckman, Haunschild 
and Phillips (2004) argue that when uncertainty is high, organizations will strive for 
homogeneity, reducing uncertainty through interactions with similar others. 
Specifically, organizations, as a threat-rigidity response (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 
1981), will seek to establish stability and trust by increasing their commitment 
towards existing partners instead of seeking new (uncertain) relationships. Their 
analyses reveal that “market uncertainty leads firms to reinforce their existing 
networks, and firm-specific uncertainty ... leads firms to reduce their broadening 
networks” (Beckman et al., 2004: 273).  
 This type of findings show that uncertainty or, in more general terms, pressure 
on the group increases the tendency of the social entity to close its ranks as a threat-
rigidity and uncertainty-reducing response. The fact that exogenous forces trigger this 
process suggests to us that the role of choice, albeit unconscious, should not be 
underestimated. We expect that especially in top management teams choice-driven 
homophily might be important, as in most cases the market for managerial talent is 
carefully screened before candidates are selected into the team (Schneider et al., 1998; 
Sørensen, 1999b). Note that whatever the source of homophily, structural or choice-
based, the end result is the same: groups tend to become more homogeneous over time 
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by selectively replacing “distant” members with people who are similar to themselves 
(see also Lawrence, 1997).  
              
Empirical evidence and theorem on firm-level homogenization 
A very limited number of top management team studies focus on team composition 
from a dynamic standpoint, and all reveal, in one way or another, this general 
tendency towards homophily: top executive management teams tend to selectively 
hire and fire to the effect that their own demographic characteristics are strengthened, 
so promoting their homosocial reproduction. Westphal and Zajac (1995), who apply 
these ideas to the board of director selection process, hypothesized that the extent to 
which incumbent CEOs can realize their preference for demographically similar new 
directors depends on the relative power of the CEO vis-à-vis the board of directors. 
They test their argument on a sample of 413 Fortune/Forbes 500 companies from 
1986 to 1991. Consistent with their arguments, they found that “(1) when incumbent 
CEOs are more powerful than their boards of directors, new directors are likely to be 
demographically similar to the firm’s CEO; (2) when boards are more powerful than 
their CEOs, new directors resemble the existing board”.  Indeed, this pair of findings 
provide evidence for homosocial reproduction, where power determines which 
group’s demographics is being reproduced – the executive or the non-executive team.  
 These ideas of Westphal and Zajac can also be applied in the context of the 
selection of new executive managers into top management teams. Indeed, Jackson, 
Brett, Sessa, Cooper, Julin & Peyronin (1991), studying 93 top management teams in 
bank holding companies over a four-year period, found that reliance on internal 
recruitment as a means for filling team vacancies resulted in greater subsequent team 
homogeneity. With respect to the turnover process, the authors demonstrated that (1) 
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teams, on average, are relatively homogeneous, (2) heterogeneity is a relatively strong 
predictor of team turnover rates, and (3) team members whose personal attributes are 
dissimilar to their team mates are more likely to leave the team than team members 
with similar attributes. 
 Finally, Boone et al. (2004) systematically analyzed the processes of selective 
entry into and exit from top management teams of the five largest newspaper-
publishing companies in the Netherlands in the period from 1970 to 1994. They 
argued that top management teams, when having the power to do so, tend to hire likes 
(in terms of demographics), while at the same time fire or “relieve” unlikes, making 
the team gravitate toward homogeneity. The authors also suggested that rational-
economic forces might operate as a countervailing force at the organizational level to 
undermine these ASA cycles. Specifically, they theorized that the cycle of homosocial 
reproduction cannot be sustained when top management teams face a compelling need 
for team composition diversity caused by conditions such as poor organizational 
performance, high corporate diversification and tough market competition.  
 Interestingly, many of their expectations were not supported. Relating to entry, 
they report that poor performance and high diversification causes teams to select likes, 
which is exactly opposite to what they expected. In addition, although more powerful 
teams do tend to select likes, their tendency to do so is even stronger when 
competitive intensity increases. Concerning exit, they found that poor organizational 
performance increases the overall likelihood of executive exit, and that dissimilar 
managers tend to leave first. In addition, the likelihood of dissimilar managers’ 
leaving appeared to be greater when firm diversification is high, which was again not 
as expected. Taking together these findings, they conclude that homosocial 
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reproduction does occur, and particularly so when the organizations face conditions 
that at first glance require more team diversity.  
 Apparently, top management teams tend to close ranks when environmental 
pressure or uncertainty increases. At the inter-firm level, these findings are 
remarkably similar to the conclusions of the network tie research of Beckman et al. 
(2004; see also Podolny, 1994). At the individual level, these results are in line with 
behavioral research into the uncertainty-reducing effect of routinized behaviors 
(Heiner, 1983; Egidi, 1996). Uncertainty, broadly defined, apparently induces a 
threat-rigidity response with respect to demographic team composition, too (Boone et 
al., 2004). The consistency of this observation in very different settings suggests that 
this reaction is strongly embedded in human and, by extension, organizational 
behavior. So, in an important respect – the composition of their upper echelon – firms 
reveal a clear tendency toward homogenization. By way of summary, we therefore 
propose       
Theorem 1: Particularly – but not exclusively – in the face of uncertainty, top 
management teams tend to selectively hire and fire to the effect that their 
own demographic characteristics are strengthened (homosocial 
reproduction), leading to team homogeneity. 
 
HOMOSOCIAL REPRODUCTION AND DIFFERENTIATION 
Team homogenization and competitive differentiation 
Do homosocial reproduction and ASA processes serve an adaptive purpose or do they 
undermine organizational performance? Schneider et al. (1995) speculate that 
homogeneity might be beneficial for organizational performance in the short run, for 
young organizations in particular, because it facilitates coordination, communication 
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and cooperation. However, survival in the long run and for old organizations may be 
undermined by the atrophying consequences of homogeneity. That is, heterogeneity 
“should provide the kinds of alternative perspectives and conflicts that stimulate 
accurate sensing of the environment and the concomitant changes required to adapt 
and cope with changes that might not otherwise be perceived” (Schneider et al., 1995: 
766). However, the upper echelon research (or homogeneity) reviewed above remains 
inconclusive on the impact of top management team heterogeneity on performance 
(Williams and O’Reilly, 1998).  
 An important reason of these inconclusive findings is that top management 
team research focuses on short-run outcome variables (e.g., ROI), failing to include 
long-run organizational performance measures such as growth, survival and 
innovation. Incorporating such measures is, however, necessary to unravel the 
complicated relationship between team diversity and organizational performance 
(Boone et al., 2004). Moreover, a full appreciation of the survival consequences of 
homosocial reproduction – and, for that matter, of top management diversity – can be 
reached only by moving beyond the atomistic perspective of the theory and 
conceiving the organization as part of an environment within which it competes for 
managerial talents and resources in the output market (see also Sørensen, 1999a; 
Cattani, Pennings & Wezel, 2004). 
 In more general terms, any evolutionary theory of organizational adaptation 
requires the study of the interplay between selection processes at different, nested 
levels of analysis (Baum & Singh, 1994a). To assess the adaptiveness of top 
management team selection processes (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) one needs to deal 
with the fact that units of adaptation are located within ecologies of other units: “Units 
of adaptations are nested, so that some adapting units (e.g., individuals) are integral 
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parts of other adapting units (e.g., organizations). The structure of relations among 
them arises from an interaction among the various nested units responding to a 
shifting environment and their own internal dynamics. These features of organization 
considerably complicate any multilevel evolutionary story” (March, 1994: 43). Such 
nested selection processes imply that what might be local adaptation at the team level, 
can be dysfunctional at the organizational level (Campbell, 1994; Baum & McKelvey, 
1999; Miller, 1999).  
 Meyer (1994) is very explicit on this, and argues that uncertainty and bounded 
rationality make organizational adaptation to the external environment almost 
impossible. Most people do not adapt to environments, but to organizational cues such 
as goals and sub-goals. This local adaptation is especially triggered when 
organizations are faced with bad news (e.g., low performance) or external threats. 
According to Meyer (1994: 110), these strategies can be very adaptive for individual 
people in order to preserve a modicum of certainty and power over their own lives: 
“internal adaptation (the kind used by people) may be independent of external 
adaptation (the kind made by organizations), and sometimes inimical to it.” In a 
similar vein, homosocial team reproduction processes can be considered as local 
team-level adaptations to external uncertainty and pressure. Whether such top 
management team-level adaptations are functional or dysfunctional will depend on the 
consequences of these processes for the higher-level ecology in the population of 
competing organizations to which these teams belong.5   
 Here, our starting point is Campbell’s (1994) claim that internal group 
homogeneity and inter-group variability set the stage for higher-level selection. 
Specifically, migration into and out of top management teams is such that selection 
and retention processes reduce within team-variation, implying that teams will, on 
 16
average, become more homogeneous over time. As organizational features, such as 
routines and strategies, can partly be considered to be a reflection of top management 
team composition (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), these homosocial reproduction 
processes have an impact on the higher-level selection entities – i.e., organizations 
that compete for growth and survival in the marketplace. The upper echelon research 
tradition has indeed demonstrated that organizational routines and strategies do not 
exist independently of the characteristics of individual human beings (Miner, 1994).  
The unfolding of homosocial reproduction along specific demographic 
characteristics and experiences of executives implies that capabilities, decisions and  
policies get reinforced over time. That is, by hiring likes and relieving unlikes routines 
and strategies are perpetuated, which in turn reinforces the tendency toward 
homosocial team reproduction. As the degree of heterogeneity in demographic 
characteristics amounts to a “proxy for cognitive heterogeneity, representing 
innovativeness, problem-solving abilities, creativity, diversity of information sources 
and perspectives, openness to change and willingness to challenge and be challenged” 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 125), the unfolding of homosocial processes will 
inevitably reduce the spectrum of opportunities available to the organization. The 
result is that organizations gradually carve out a specialized niche in resource space. 
As these processes apply to all organizations within a given population, homosocial 
team reproduction goes hand in hand with between-firm differentiation in top 
management team composition, reducing niche overlap among organizations. 
Paradoxically, team homogenization processes may well trigger and sustain 




Need for differentiation and organizational diversity 
Before connecting micro to macro logic more precisely, we must first briefly review 
the latter. A central question in OE relates to the explanation of organizational 
diversity: where does organizational diversity come from, and what explains its 
evolution over time? In the past three decades, a series of theory fragments in OE has 
sought – and still does so – to answer this key question (Hannan, 2005). In the context 
of the current paper, we briefly discuss three of such theory fragments: the localized 
competition argument (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), the resource-partitioning model 
(Carroll, 1985) and niche-overlap logic (Baum & Singh, 1994b & c). What this set of 
theory fragments have in common, is that they start from the ecological concept of the 
niche. Organizations address with their offer certain client or customer tastes, 
indicated by points in the n-dimensional resource space.  
 First, localized competition was already introduced in Hannan and Freeman’s 
1977 classic contribution. The key argument is that an organization is particularly 
subject to competition from rivals that are located on close distance in resource space. 
That is, the closer organization i and j are in resource space, the more intense their 
competition will be. Subsequent work further specified the underlying distance 
notion. For example, size-localized competition (Hannan, Ranger Moore & Banaszak-
Holl, 1990; Amburgey, Dacin & Kelly, 1994) argues that competition is partitioned 
along the size gradient: i.e., similarly sized organizations compete most intensely. The 
reason for this is that the kind of resources firms’ use or the type of strategy they 
pursue is closely associated with their size. More generally, localized competition 
relates the intensity of rivalry to distance in a multidimensional space, introducing 
such aspects as capacity, geography, price, product and technology next to mere size 
(Baum & Mezias, 1992; Baum & Haveman, 1997; Dobrev et al., 2002). 
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Second, in 1985, Glenn Carroll introduced a resource-partitioning argument to 
explain a paradoxical phenomenon observed in many industrial populations: 
increasing firm concentration can open the way for entry of new organizations at the 
market peripheries. Resource-partitioning theory distinguishes two organizational 
types according to their niche spans. On the one hand, generalist organizations are 
characterized by a broad fundamental niche: their products attract people from very 
different taste groups. On the other hand, specialist organizations have a narrow 
niche: their offer focuses on specific tastes. The generalists’ advantage derives from 
their broad and rich potential customer base. But because of their broad appeal, their 
offer cannot be as precisely tuned at the customers’ wishes as that of specialists. This 
is in contrast with the sharply put stance of specialist organizations, which can exploit 
their niche with high effectiveness, attracting a high percentage of the clients from 
their narrower customer base. The resource-partitioning model describes how 
selection processes structure organizational populations according to their niche spans 
when resources are unevenly distributed in the environment, forming a market center 
abundant in demand vis-à-vis a resource-scarce market periphery (Carroll, 1985; 
Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Evidence abounds that indeed generalist concentration is 
positively associated with specialist viability (for an overview, see Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000). 
Third, niche overlap is argued to have two potentially opposing effects on 
organizational performance (Baum & Haveman, 1997; Boone, Wezel & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2005). On the negative side, more niche overlap implies more intense 
crowding competition for similar resources; on the positive side, more niche overlap 
may produce mutualistic agglomeration-type of benefits. On the one hand, in a series 
of studies, Baum and colleagues explore the crowding effect of niche overlap (and its 
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complement: the mutualistic impact of non-overlap). In their study of Torontonian 
day care centers, Baum and Singh (1994b) find support for their hypothesis that 
niche-overlap density decreases entry in the focal niche, whereas non-overlap density 
increases founding rates. The former effect is argued to relate to crowding and 
competition, whilst the latter is explained by the potential benefits of mutualism when 
entrepreneurs enter niches that border other viable niches with low overlap. Similarly, 
Baum and Singh (1994c) reveal that niche-overlap density and non-overlap density 
are positively and negatively associated with mortality rates, respectively. In line with 
this finding, Baum and Singh (1996) report that differentiation – i.e., moving to less 
competitive niches – increases the day care centers’ survival chances. Finally, Baum 
and Oliver (1996) report evidence in the context of founding rates in Torontonian day 
care centers that mutualistic non-overlap is enhanced in the presence of crowding. On 
the other hand, Baum and Haveman (1997) and Boone et al. (2005) add to this logic 
that niche overlap might have a mutualistic impact as well, pointing to a set spillover 
effects that may benefit organizations that cluster together. 
 Whatever are their differences, the alternative theories of market partitioning 
share a common key assumption: at the demand side of the market, the variety of 
tastes is such that a need for differentiation arises. That is, customers in niche i prefer 
a product offer that is quite different from their counterparts in niche j. The further 
apart niches i and j are in resource space, the larger is this taste difference. Take, 
again, Carroll’s (1985) resource-partitioning model, to start with. Resource-
partitioning processes emerge if a number of necessary conditions are met (Boone, 
Carroll & van Witteloostuijn, 2002 & 2004; Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 2004). A 
critical one is that the resource space must reveal sufficient heterogeneity, with a 
resource-abundant center and a resource-poor periphery. In a similar vein, other 
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theories of market partitioning need such a resource space heterogeneity assumption. 
For instance, niche-packing theory (Péli & Nooteboom, 1999) assumes a flat resource 
space, implying that resources are distributed over a (wide) variety of taste niches. 
 Without taste variety, market partitioning will not emerge. For instance, if the 
resource space features resource-rich homogeneity only, then specialist organizations 
cannot operate viably. After all, in such a market, there is no peripheral demand for 
specific offerings, as all customers prefer the same middle-of-the-road variety. For 
instance, demand for special types of petrol or salt is very limited: for by far the 
majority of customers, only price matters. Then, the demand side’s low variety of 
tastes is reflected in supply-side homogeneity. Market partitioning will not emerge, 
because the demand side’s preferences reflect a need for homogeneity, rather than a 
desire for heterogeneity. 
 In all, the above logic gives our second theorem. 
Theorem 2: Under the condition of sufficient demand-side heterogeneity (i.e., 
taste variety), firms tend to differentiate themselves away from their 
competitors to the extent that they spread across the resource space’s niches, 
leading to industry heterogeneity. 
 
A MULTI-LEVEL THEORY OF REPRODUCTION AND DIVERSITY 
Conditions and propositions 
We are now ready to illustrate how, under certain conditions, macro-level partitioning 
may unfold from micro-level processes of homosocial reproduction, linking Theorem 
1 to Theorem 2. Before turning to more specific propositions, it is useful to make 
explicit the major assumptions underlying the theory. That is, how this micro-macro 
interaction evolves over time, very much depends upon the underlying conditions at 
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the supply side (potential managers) and the demand side (potential customers). A 
minimum level of resource diversity is needed at both the input and output side of 
organizations to produce the between-firm differentiation effects described above. It is 
clear that if the distribution of demographic characteristics of top managers who may 
enter into a population has low variance, then the compositional differences between 
teams in the industry will be low as well, irrespective of the potency of homosocial 
reproduction. As a result, team reproduction can then not be a source of market-level 
partitioning.8 The same reasoning applies to output markets. A minimum level of 
resource heterogeneity with respect to customer tastes is required for organizations to 
be able to differentiate and occupy isolated niches (for an overview of the impact of 
different resource environments, see van Witteloostuijn & Boone, 2006).9 So, the 
main necessary conditions are: 
Condition 1: Supply-side heterogeneity with respect to demographic 
characteristics of top managers is sufficiently high. 
Condition 2: Demand-side heterogeneity with respect to customer tastes is 
sufficiently high. 
By way of illustration, several more specific propositions can be derived from our 
theory. Without losing generality, we focus on two firms only (firm i and j), for the 
sake of parsimony. The model distinguishes three levels of analysis – team, 
organization and market (i.e., population) –, linking micro-level processes of team 
adaptation with ecological selection at the market level.  
At the most general level, we predict that markets over time will show features 
of market partitioning (e.g., localized competition, monopolistic competition, niche 
packing or resource partitioning) the more top managers are sorted into teams based 
on the principle of homophily. That is, every organization eventually specializes to 
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serve niches with minimal overlap with the niches of other organizations. In 
economics terms, in the extreme, every firm may then act as a local monopolist in the 
niche of the market where its product offer comes closest to the taste of local 
customers – this is the classic case of monopolistic competition (Hotelling, 1929). The 
reasoning is as follows. If the ASA processes within the firms’ upper echelons lead to 
different team characteristics, organizations will carve out different niches, resulting 
in strategic differentiation. If sets of organizations, however, happen to reproduce 
around similar top manager characteristics, they will carve out similar niches, 
resulting in niche overlap. Niche overlap will put pressure on organizations to 
differentiate, especially when the carrying capacity of the niche is low. Figure 1 
illustrates how the process unfolds. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To summarize, our theory suggests that market partitioning may result from top 
management team homogenization (given that teams gravitate toward different team 
demographic compositions). Because differentiation can boost organizational 
performance (Hotelling,1929; Baum & Mezias, 1992; Boone et al., 2002 & 2004), it 
reinforces the process of homosocial reproduction at the team level (a feedback loop 
not shown in figure 1, for the sake of parsimony). That is, in order to avoid the 
downsides of crowding, spreading across the resource space’s niche structure 
stimulates organizational performance by reducing niche overlap, on average. 
Similarly, competition among organizations – i.e., niche overlap – directly spurs team 
homogenization. Indeed, McPherson and colleagues showed that competitive 
pressures from other organizations for members sharpen and focus the compositional 
features of the group (the so-called social niche), resulting in organizational 
homogeneity (McPherson, 1983; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987) – a result that is 
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in line with the findings from research on inter-firm, team and individual behavior 
(e.g., Heiner, 1983; Beckman et al., 2004; Boone et al., 2004). The end result of such 
positive feedback cycles is that there will be a fairly tight match between top 
management team composition and organizational niche position in the long run. In 
all, this suggests 
Proposition 1: Provided that Conditions 1 and 2 hold, the higher the potency 
of homosocial reproduction at the top management team level, (a) the higher 
the extent of market partitioning and (b) the lower the level of niche overlap. 
Given our prediction that uncertainty increases the tendency toward homosocial 
reproduction, we expect that the process of market partitioning will especially 
materialize in periods of high uncertainty. Podolny (1994) also suggested that 
uncertainty reinforces market partitioning. In a sense, one could argue that the team-
level process of homosocial reproduction is adaptive at the population level. This is 
because the threat-rigidity response at the team level eventually decreases niche 
overlap and competition at the market level, reducing the uncertainty that triggered 
the process in the first place. Note that a tightly packed resource space reduces 
uncertainty in another way, too, as it hampers entry (Péli & Nooteboom, 1999) and 
stabilizes organizational density. 
 Moreover, the model predicts that homosocial reproduction sets in motion a 
process of differentiation between pairs of firms, both with respect to the 
compositional characteristics of their top management teams, as well as the strategic 
niche positions these organizations occupy. Different organizations will gravitate 
towards different specific top management team demographic characteristics. Given 
that average compositional differences imply variance in capabilities and preferences, 
these firms will also develop different routines and strategies (Finkelstein & 
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Hambrick, 1996; Sørensen, 1999a; Cattani et al., 2004). Therefore, we expect for each 
dyad of organizations, and given that the carving of specialized niches will be more 
forcefully present when teams are relatively homogeneous, 
Proposition 2: (a) A focal firm’s distance from a competitor with respect to its 
top management team’s average demographic composition is positively 
related to its strategic distance vis-à-vis this competitor, (b) especially under 
conditions of high uncertainty. 
From the literature on crowding and niche overlap cited above follows that 
differentiation decreases competition, and therefore increases organizational 
performance. As Hotelling (1929) explained, for example, positive price premia 
emerge if products are different, since then each firm can operate as a local 
monopolist in the niche of the market where its product offer comes closest to the 
taste of local customers. Similar predictions have been made in the strategic 
management literature. Gimeno and Woo (1996), for instance, find in their sample of 
more than 3000 city-pair markets in the U.S. airline industry that strategic similarity 
among airlines increases the intensity of rivalry. Specifically, the yield to an airline, 
defined as the average price charged by a firm to passengers in a city-pair market 
divided by the distance of the market, decreases when the average strategic similarity 
to competitors increases.10 Moreover, Sørenson (1999a) found that commercial 
television stations grow faster the more the average tenure of the top management 
team differs from that of its competitors. Taken together, this suggests that the 
positive impact of differentiation with respect to team composition on organizational 
performance is mediated by strategic dissimilarity resulting from demographic 
differences. This argument leads to 
 25
Proposition 3: There is a positive impact of a focal firm’s (a) average distance 
from competitors with respect to its top management team’s mean 
demographic composition on (long run) organizational performance,11 where 
(b) this relationship is mediated by the average strategic distance of the focal 
firm from its competitors. 
Finally, the model also helps to unravel the performance implications of top 
management team demographic diversity. Most authors have suggested and presented 
evidence that top management team homogeneity facilitates (or, at least, does not 
hamper) performance in the short run (Schneider, 1987; Boone et al., 1998; Boone et 
al., 2004; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987). As mentioned earlier, research is not 
conclusive with respect to the long-run implications of top management team 
diversity. Our ecologically informed model suggests that the (long run) performance 
consequences of top team homogeneity depend on market-partitioning processes and 
the position of other firms in product space. On a general level, we expect that 
homogeneity will only be positively associated with (long-run) organizational 
performance, particularly the likelihood of survival, in partitioned markets with low 
niche overlap among competitors. That is, an individual organization’s likelihood of 
survival depends critically upon its position in resource space. 
 More specifically, a focal organization with a homogeneous top team will 
outperform its competitors when it occupies isolated positions in product market 
space and, mutatis mutandis, in the distribution of managerial demographic 
characteristics. Conversely, if the organization happens to be located in an overly 
crowded niche, long-run organizational performance will be harmed. Again, 
homosocial reproduction will fuel this process. If an organization is located in an 
unfavorable niche, short-run performance will suffer. As a threat-rigidity and 
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uncertainty-reducing response, ranks will be closed by hiring ‘clones’ and ‘relieving’ 
atypical executives (Boone et al., 2004). This implies that the organization further 
digs its own grave by investing in routines and strategies that fit with the ‘wrong’ 
niche. Overall, this logic results in 
Proposition 4: Top management team homogeneity increases (long-run) 
organizational performance, when (a) the focal firm’s average distance from 
competitors with respect to its top management team’s mean demographic 
composition is large,12 where this relationship is mediated by the average 
strategic distance of the focal firm from its competitors. 
 
APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSION 
Two important streams of demographic research have developed independently over 
the last 25 years or so: within-firm organizational demography (Pfeffer, 1983), with 
an emphasis on (top management) team composition (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and 
population-level demography or organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), 
studying the dynamics of diversity among organizations. Both research traditions 
strictly focused on the selection processes operating within the boundaries of the 
chosen level of analysis: micro (individual and team) versus macro (organization and 
population). We argued, however, that in order to advance the field of top 
management team research (and organizational ecology, for that matter) we need to 
build more comprehensive evolutionary models of organizational adaptation 
explicating the interplay between selection processes at different, nested levels of 
analysis (Baum & Singh, 1994a). In this paper, we made a first attempt by theorizing 
about how the within-team variety-reducing behavioral mechanism of homophily 
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shapes between-firm competitive outcomes and organizational diversity, and vice 
versa.  
  Five final comments and limitations are worth mentioning. First, discovering 
the general mechanisms behind the origin of organizational diversity has attracted the 
attention of many scholars for more than a century. Durkheim (1893/1933: 266) 
already speculated on how organizational diversity is driven by endogenous forces as 
follows: “if work becomes divided more as societies become more voluminous and 
denser, it is not because external circumstances are more varied, but because the 
struggle for existence is more acute.” In the present paper, we build on this insight by 
explicating one such endogenous mechanism, arguing that team homogenization 
processes, paradoxically, drive population-level organizational diversity. In other 
words, homosocial reproduction magnifies social differences, rather than mitigating 
them (see also Popielarz & McPherson, 1995: 699).  
  We acknowledge that the behavioral theory of organizational diversity we 
presented here is extremely general and, as a result, that the predictive power in any 
specific setting will be relatively low, on average. To be able to develop more specific 
hypotheses, additional conditions must be introduced, reflecting the specificities of 
the case at hand. Above, we illustrated this for the case of market partitioning, 
imposing two additional conditions upon the argument as to sufficient heterogeneity 
at the demand or output side (i.e., potential customers) and the supply or input side 
(i.e., potential managers) of the market. Specifically, we think that the field of 
organization theory and strategy badly needs general theories that unify the 
increasingly disparate pieces of literature and provide a parsimonious baseline logic to 
understand complicated phenomena based on firmly grounded behavioral principles. 
In this respect, we follow McPherson and Ranger-Moore (1991: 37), who defend their 
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approach in modeling the impressive diversity of forms found in the voluntary sector 
as follows: “our model is a unified view of one process that underlies all this 
otherwise confusing diversity. By grounding the model in universal aspects of 
organizations (i.e., all organizations contain people), sociodemographic variables (i.e., 
all individuals have a value of age), and social networks (i.e., all networks are 
homophilous), and ignoring the aspects for which we cannot yet account ... we avoid 
the pitfall of focusing on uniqueness at the expense of generality and redirect attention 
to those phenomena that we may be able to explain” (see also Mark, 1998). Similarly, 
we hope to have illustrated that simple general mechanisms such as homosocial 
reproduction, niche carving and strategic distance generate novel propositions with 
respect to team composition outcomes. This really implies integrating ecology and 
strategy arguments, which we think has great potential. In future work, we hope to 
explore the ecology – strategy interface further, particularly by developing similar 
arguments for other cases than market partitioning. 
  Second, because top management research in the past has mainly focused on 
demographic characteristics of executives, we also did so in developing our theory, 
ignoring the social networks of executives. One should be aware that there exists an 
ongoing debate in the literature about the relative explanatory power of the attributes 
of individuals per se versus the relations between them (Popielarz & McPherson, 
1995; Reagans, Zuckerman & McEvily, 2004). In future work, it might be worthwhile 
(though probably even more demanding) to also collect longitudinal data on the 
network ties of executives (McPherson et al., 2001). Luckily, however, the work of 
McPherson and colleagues shows that the relative positions of individuals in social 
space can act as a proxy for the network connections people have, making the debate 
less salient. Specifically, “through the organizing structure of social space, the 
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attributes of individuals summarize their homophilous relations with others who are 
near and distant in social space” (Popielarz & McPherson, 1995: 716). 
  Third, we were silent about executive migration. It may be, though, that the 
market-partitioning outcome of the process is only sustainable when top management 
team mobility between organizations is relatively low. That is because frequent 
within-industry migration fosters transmission of routines and strategies across the 
population’s organizations, increasing their similarity (Wezel et al., 2005). Indeed, 
Sørenson's (1999b) study on executive migration among commercial television 
stations suggests that recruitment of executives from competitors increases niche 
overlap and competition. Two additional comments on within-industry executive 
migration are worth making, though. For one, migration probably also follows 
predictable patterns (see the introduction in Baum & Singh, 1994a). Specifically, it is 
not unlikely that migration of managerial characteristics and related capabilities 
(Sørenson, 1999b) mainly occurs among organizations that are similar. If this is the 
case, then the countervailing impact of managerial mobility on the market-partitioning 
process will be tempered.  
 Moreover, recent empirical research shows that within-industry executive mobility 
is especially high in homogeneous compared to heterogeneous industries. Parrino 
(1997: 195), studying 977 CEO succession events in large public firms between 1969 
and 1989, finds that “the likelihood of turnover, forced turnover and outside 
succession increase with the similarity of the firms in an industry. Furthermore, the 
likelihood that a fired CEO is replaced by an executive from another firm in the same 
industry also increases with industry homogeneity.” In homogeneous industries, 
organizations pursue similar strategies, and as a result need similar managerial talent. 
This facilitates the exchange of executives among organizations within the industry. 
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Interestingly, this suggests that the market-partitioning process we described above is 
difficult to revoke, as organizational diversity hampers the transmission of routines 
between organizations via executive migration. 
  Fourth, note that the ideas developed in this paper are similar to the arguments 
presented in the seminal work of McPherson and colleagues on voluntary 
organizations, and Sørensen’s work on the ecology of managerial tenure distributions. 
However, there are important differences. McPherson’s ecological analyses are 
restricted to competition among voluntary organizations for members, invoking the 
principle of homophily to predict the location of organizations in Blau (demographic) 
space. In other words, their focus is on organizational input markets, ignoring the 
specific output of these voluntary organizations, and the competition resulting thereof 
in output or product markets. Although it might be interesting to do so, we did not 
focus on competition among organizations for managerial talent (for an exception, see 
Sørensen, 1999b). Instead, we theorized on how homosocial reproduction impinges on 
competition in output (product) markets, which is important when one wants to extend 
the study of the implications of homophily to for-profit organizations.  
  Sørensen (1999a) does focus on competition between organizations in 
products markets in his study of organizational growth of commercial television 
stations. His main finding is that the distance of a focal firm’s top management team 
mean tenure to the mean tenure of competitors increases a focal firm’s growth rate. 
The putative reason is that overlap in tenure goes hand in hand with overlap in 
managerial capabilities, which leads to greater competition for resources since 
managers shape a firm’s pattern of resource utilization. Although Sørensen also urges 
researchers to analyze the ecological interplay of top management team composition 
in relation to other organizations, we extend this logic in three ways. Firstly, Sørensen 
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restricts his analysis to the firm’s mean managerial tenure, whereas our focus is on 
demographic homogeneity. Secondly, Sørensen does not theorize on where specific 
demographic team distributions come from in the first place, which is the central 
starting point of our theory. Thirdly, Sørensen empirically models firm growth, 
whereas we try to develop a more comprehensive model linking micro-level team 
composition dynamics, strategic behavior and market-level outcomes. 
  Fifth, we would like to reflect on the adaptation-selection debate with 
reference to the accompanying paper by Wiersema and Moliterno in this volume. We 
believe that our and their contributions are complementary in at least three ways. 
First, our paper stresses, as do Campbell (1994) and Meyer (1994), the importance of 
internal adaptation, whereas Wiersema and Moliterno focus on external adaptation. 
That is, in our model, managers adapt to internal goals, preferences, and opportunities 
and threats, resulting in team reproduction and homogeneity. This is a baseline 
process that does not exclude the fact that managers need to adapt – and do try so – to 
external (exogenous) shifts in the environment as well (cf. Boone et al., 2004). 
Second, the internal adaptation processes we described above are evolutionary in 
nature, and are well placed to explain incrementally emerging and evolving processes. 
Wiersema and Moliterno define external adaptation as reactions to punctuated or 
discontinuous change, which disturb periods of incremental (internal) adaptation. So, 
one could argue that punctuated shocks from time to time disrupt the target of team 
reproduction. Third, all hypotheses of Wiersema and Moliterno are consistent with 
our argument. Homosocial reproduction is most forcefully operating when TMTs 
have the power to reproduce their characteristics. Hence, in settings where the 
financial stakeholders are relatively powerful (e.g., in the case of many institutional 
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investors and large blockholders), the process of TMT reproduction may well be 
undermined. 
  A more fundamental issue is that Wiersema and Moliterno do not make a 
distinction between the event of CEO dismissal and the adaptive value of such an 
event. The adaptive power of CEO dismissal is, however, highly questionable, as 
Wiersema and Moliterno acknowledge in their discussion (see also Wiersema, 2002). 
For one, evidence to date has not revealed that CEO dismissal leads to better 
performance. Moreover, our multi-level theory suggests that the massive hypish wave 
of CEO dismissals, resulting from pressures of the financial community, might even 
be non-adaptive (cf. Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004). That is, if firms hire similar 
CEOs (e.g., with a financial background), then homogeneity and competition are 
likely to increase, which may ultimately undermine firm performance in the long run. 
In this respect, Wiersema and Moliterno claim that diversity in the US automobile 
industry was lower in the old era compared to the new era. These opposite claims (is 
CEO diversity decreasing or increasing over time?) suggest an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
  Finally, we realize that the theory we presented here is very demanding with 
respect to data collection. One needs longitidinal demographic data on executives, 
executive entry and exit events have to be carefully recorded, and team-level data 
have to be linked to organization-level information on strategies, niches and 
performance. So, the research design involves a combination of the already 
demanding requirements of ecology and demography studies. Nevertheless, recent 
work, focusing on parts of the model, shows that it is doable and, more importantly, 
that the results are very promising (Sørensen, 1999a; Boone et al., 2004; Cattani et al., 
2004). Indeed, we strongly believe that this is the type of ecology – strategy dialogue 
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that is very likely to produce new insights in the future, linking different levels of 
analyses in an overarching adaptation – selection logic. 
 
Acknowledgement. We would like to thank Joel Baum and Stanislav Dobrev for their 
very insightful comments. Of course, all remaining errors are ours. 
 34
REFERENCES 
Amburgey, T. L., Dacin, T. and Kelly, D. (1994). Disruptive Selection and Population 
Segmentation: Interpopulation Competition as a Segregating Process. In J. A. C. 
Baum and J. V. Singh (Eds), Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations (pp. 240-
254). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Axelrod R. and Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation. Science 211, 
1139-1136.  
Baum J. A. C. and Haveman, H. (1997). Love thy Neighbor?: Differentiation and 
Agglomeration in the Manhattan Hotel Industry, 1898-1990. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 42, 304-338.  
Baum, J. A. C. and McKelvey, B. (1999). Variations in Organization Science: In 
Honor of Donald T. Campbell. Oxford UK: Sage Publications. 
Baum J. A. C. and Mezias S. (1992). Localized Competition and Organizational 
Failure in the Manhattan Hotel Industry 1898-1990. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 37, 580-604. 
Baum, J. A. C. and Oliver, C. (1996). Toward an Institutional Ecology of 
Organizational Founding. Academy of Management Journal 39, 1378-1427. 
Baum, J. A. C. and Singh, J. V. (1994a). Organizational Hierarchies and Evolutionary 
Processes: Some Reflections on a Theory of Organizational Evolution. In J. A. C. 
Baum and J. V. Singh (Eds), Evolutionary dynamics of organizations (pp. 3-22). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Baum, J. A. C. and Singh, J. V. (1994b). Organizational Niche Overlap and the 
Dynamics of Organizational Founding. Organization Science 5, 483-502.  
 35
Baum, J. A. C. and Singh, J. V. (1994c). Organizational Niche Overlap and the 
Dynamics of Organizational Mortality. American Journal of Sociology 100, 346-
380. 
Baum, J. A. C. and Singh, J. V. (1996). Dynamics of Organizational Responses to 
Competition. Social Forces 74, 1261-1297. 
Beckman, C. M., Haunschild, P. R. and Phillips, D. J. (2004).  Friends or Strangers? 
Firm-Specific Uncertainty, Market Uncertainty, and Network Partner Selection. 
Organization Science 15, 259-275. 
Blau, P. M. (1977). Inequality and Heterogeneity. New York: The Free Press. 
Boone, C., Carroll, G. R. and Witteloostuijn, A. van (2002). Resource Distributions 
and Market Partitioning: Dutch Daily Newspapers, 1968 to 1994. American 
Sociological Review 67, 408-431. 
Boone, C., Carroll, G. R. and Witteloostuijn, A. van (2004). Size, Differentiation and 
the Growth and Profitability of Dutch Daily Newspapers. Industrial and 
Corporate Change 13, 117-148. 
Boone, C., Olffen, W. van and Witteloostuijn, A. van (1998). Psychological Top 
Management Team Make-Up and Economic Firm Performance: An Experimental 
Study. Journal of Economic Psychology 19, 43-73.  
Boone, C., Olffen, W. van and Witteloostuijn, A. van (2005). Team Locus-of-Control 
Composition, Leadership Structure, Information Acquisition, and Financial 
Performance: A Business Simulation Study. Academy of Management Journal 48, 
889-909. 
Boone, C., Olffen, W. van, Witteloostuijn, A. van and B. De Brabander (2004). The 
Genesis of Top Management Team Diversity: Selective Turnover among Top 
 36
Management Teams in Dutch Newspaper Publishing, 1970-94. Academy of 
Management Journal 47, 633-656. 
Boone, C., Wezel, F. C. and Witteloostuijn, A. van (2005). An Ecological Theory of 
Population-Level Diversity Dependence. Working paper. Antwerpen: University 
of Antwerpen. 
Boone, C. and Witteloostuijn, A. van (2004). Towards a Unified Theory of Market 
Partitioning: Integrating Resource Partitioning and Sunk Cost Theories of Dual 
Market Structures. Industrial and Corporate Change 13, 701-726. 
Bornstein, G. and Ben-Yossef, M. (1994). Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-
Group Social Dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 30, 52-67. 
Bornstein, G. (2003). Intergroup Conflict: Individual, Group, and Collective Interests. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review 7, 129- 145. 
Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Byrne, D. (1971). The Attraction Paradigm. New York: Academic Press. 
Campbell, D. T. (1969). Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-Cultural 
Evolution. General Systems 16, 69-85. 
Campbell, D. T. (1994). How Individual and Face-to-Face Group Selection 
Undermine Firm Selection in Organizational Evolution. In J. A. C. Baum and J. 
V. Singh (Eds), Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations (pp. 23-38). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Carroll, G. R. (1985). Concentration and Specialization: Dynamics of Niche Width in 
Populations of Organizations. American Journal of Sociology 90, 1262-1283.  
Carroll, G. R. and Hannan, M. T. (2000). The Demography of Corporations and 
Industries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 37
Carroll, G. R. and Swaminathan, A. (2000). Why the Microbrewery Movement? 
Organizational Dynamics of Resource Partitioning in the American Brewing 
Industry after Prohibition. American Journal of Sociology 106, 715-762. 
Cattani, G., Pennings, J. M. and Wezel, F. C. (2004). Heterogeneity Shifts due to 
Member Mobility: New Insights on Diversity and Performance. Working paper. 
Tilburg: Tilburg University. 
Clore, G. L. and Byrne, D. (1974). A Reinforcement Affect Model of Attraction. In T. 
L. Huston (Ed.), Foundations of Interpersonal Attraction (pp. 143-170). New 
York: Academic Press. 
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American 
Sociological Review 48, 147-160. 
Dobrev, S. D. (2006). Career Mobility and Job Flocking. Social Sciences Research 
(forthcoming). 
Dobrev, S. D., Kim, T.-Y. and Carroll, G. R. (2002). The Evolution of Organizational 
Niches: U.S. Automobile Manufacturers 1885–1981. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 47, 233-264. 
Durkheim, E. [1893] (1933). The Division of Labor in Society. Translated by George 
Simpson. New York: Free Press. 
Egidi, M. (1996). Routines, Hierarchies of Problems, Procedural Behaviour: Some 
Evidence from Experiments. In K. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman and C. 
Schmidt (Eds), The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour (pp. 303-333). 
London: Macmillan.  
Feld, S. (1982). Structural Determinants of Similarity among Associates. American 
Sociological Review 47, 797-801. 
 38
Finkelstein, S. and Hambrick, D. C. (1996). Strategic Leadership: Top executives and 
their effects on organizations. St. Paul MN: West Publishing Company. 
Gimeno, J. and Woo, C. Y. (1996). Hypercompetition in a Multimarket Environment: 
The Role of Strategic Similarity and Multimarket Contact in Competitive De-
escalation. Organization Science 7, 322-341. 
Hambrick, D. C. and Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper Echelons: Organizations as a 
Reflection of Its Top Managers. Academy of Management Review 9, 193-206. 
Hamilton, D. (1964). The Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior. Journal of 
Theoretical Biology 7, 1-16. 
Hannan, M. T. (2005). Ecologies of Organizations: Diversity and Identity. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 19, 51-70. 
Hannan, M. T. and Freeman, J. (1977). The Population Ecology of Organizations. 
American Journal of Sociology 83, 929-984.  
Hannan, M. T., Ranger-Moore, J. and Banaszak-Holl, J. (1990). Competition and the 
Evolution of Organizational Size Distributions. In J. V. Singh (Ed.), 
Organizational Evolution: New Directions. Beverly Hills CA: Sage. 
Haveman, H. A. (1995). The Demographic Metabolism of Organizations: Industry 
Dynamics, Turnover, and Tenure Distributions. Administrative Science Quarterly 
40, 586-618. 
Haveman, H. A. (2000). The Future of Organizational Sociology: Forging Ties among 
Paradigms. Contemporary Sociology 29, 476- 486. 
Haveman, H. A. and Cohen, L. E. (1994). The Ecological Dynamics of Careers: The 
Impact of Organizational Founding, Dissolution, and Merger on Job Mobility. 
American Journal of Sociology 100, 153-195. 
 39
Heiner, R. (1983). The Origin of Predictable Behaviour. American Economic Review 
73, 560-595.  
Hinds, P. J., Carley, K. M., Krackhardt, D. and Wholey, D. (2000). Choosing Work 
Group Members: Balancing Similarity, Competence, and Familiarity. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 81, 226-251. 
Hogg, M. A. and Mullin, B. A. (1999). Joining Groups to Reduce Uncertainty: 
Subjective Uncertainty Reduction and Group Identification. In D. Abrams and M.  
A. Hogg (Eds), Social Identity and Social Contagion (pp. 249-279). Malden MA: 
Blackwell. 
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in Competition. Economic Journal 39, 41–57. 
Huston, T. L. and Levinger, G. (1978). Interpersonal Attraction and Relationships. 
Annual Review Psychology 29, 115-156. 
Jackson, S. E.,  Brett, J. F., Sessa, V. I., Cooper, D. M., Julin, J. A. and Peyronnin, K. 
(1991). Some Differences Make a Difference: Individual Dissimilarity and Group 
Heterogeneity as Correlates of Recruitment, Promotions, and Turnover. Journal of 
Applied Psychology 76, 675-689. 
Kanter, R. M. (1977). Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books. 
Lawrence, B. S. (1997). Opening the Black Box of Organizational Demography. 
Organization Science 8, 1-22. 
Lazarsfeld, P. F. and Merton, R. K. (1954). Friendship as a Social Process: A 
Substantive and Methodological Analysis. In M. Berger, T. Abel and C. H. Page 
(Eds), Freedom and Control in Modern Society (pp. 18-66). New York: Van 
Nostrand. 
LeVine, R. A. and Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, 
Ethnic Attitude and Group Behavior. New York: Wiley. 
 40
Maijoor, S. J. and Witteloostuijn, A. van (1996). An Empirical Test of the 
Resource-Based Theory: Strategic Regulation in the Dutch Audit Industry. 
Strategic Management Journal 17, 549-569. 
March, J. M. (1994). The Evolution of Evolution. In J. A. C. Baum and J. V. Singh 
(Eds), Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations (pp. 239-52). Oxford UK: Oxford 
University Press.  
Mark, N.  (1998). Birds of a Feather Sing Together. Social Forces 77, 453-485. 
McPherson, J. M. (1983). An Ecology of Affiliation. American Sociological Review 
48, 519-532. 
McPherson, J. M. and Ranger-Moore, J. R. (1991). Evolution on a Dancing 
Landscape: Organizations and Networks in Dynamic Blau Space. Social Forces 
70, 19-42.   
McPherson, J. M. and Rotolo, T. (1996). Testing a Dynamic Model of Social 
Composition: Diversity and Change in Voluntary Groups. American Sociological 
Review 61, 179-202. 
McPherson, J. M. and Smith-Lovin, L. (1987). Homophily in Voluntary 
Organizations: Status Distance and the Composition of Face-to-Face Groups. 
American Sociological Review 52, 370-379. 
McPherson, J. M., Popielarz, P. A. and Drobnic, S. (1992). Social Networks and 
Organizational Dynamics. American Sociological Review 57, 153-170. 
McPherson, J. M., Smith-Lovin, L. and Cook, J. (2001). Birds of a Feather: 
Homophily in Social Networks. Annual Review of Sociology 27, 415-444. 
Meyer, M. W. (1994). Turning Evolution Inside the Organization. In J. A. C. Baum 
and J. V. Singh (Eds), Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations (pp. 109–116). 
Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. 
 41
Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure 
as Myth and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83, 340-363. 
Miner, A. S. (1994). Seeking Adaptive Advantage: Evolutionary Theory and 
Managerial Action. In J. A. C. Baum and J. V. Singh (Eds) Evolutionary 
Dynamics of Organizations (pp. 76-89). Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. 
Miner, A. S. and Anderson, P. (1999). Industry and Population-Level Learning: 
Organizational, Inter-Organizational and Collective Learning Processes. In A. S. 
Miner and P. Anderson (Eds), Advances in Strategic Management: Population-
Level Learning and Industry Change (pp. 1-31). Stamford CR: JAI Press. 
Miner, A. S. and Haunschild, P. R. (1995). Population-Level Learning. In L. L. 
Cummings and B. M. Staw (Eds), Research in Organizational Behavior (pp. 115-
166). Greenwich CN: JAI Press. 
Miller, D. (1999). Selection Processes Inside Organizations: The Self-Reinforcing 
Consequences of Success. In J. A. C. Baum and B. McKelvey (Eds), Variations 
in Organization Science (pp. 93-112). Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Parrino, R. (1997). CEO Turnover and Outside Succession: A Cross-Sectional 
Analysis.  Journal of Financial Economics 46, 165-197.   
Péli, G. & B. Nooteboom (1999). Market Partitioning and the Geometry of the 
Resource Space. American Journal of Sociology 104, 1132-1153. 
Pennings, J. M., Lee, K. and Witteloostuijn, A. van (1998). Human Capital, Social 
Capital, and Firm Dissolution. Academy of Management Journal 41, 425-440.  
Pfeffer, J. (1983). Organizational Demography. Research in Organizational Behavior 
5, 299-357. 
Pfeffer, J. (1997). New Directions for Organization Theory: Problems and Prospects. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 42
Podolny, J. M. (1994). Market Uncertainty and the Social Character of Economic 
Exchange. Administrative Science Quarterly 39, 458-483. 
Popielarz, P. A. and McPherson, J. M. (1995). On the Edge or in between: Niche 
Position, Niche Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Association 
Memberships. American Journal of Sociology 101, 698-720. 
Reagans, R., Zuckerman, E. and McEvily, B. (2004). How to Make the Team: Social 
Networks vs. Demography as Criteria for Designing Effective Teams. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 49, 101-133. 
Ruef, M., Aldrich, H. E. and Carter, N. M. (2003). The Structure of Founding Teams: 
Homophily, Strong Ties, and Isolation among U.S. Entrepreneurs. American 
sociological Review 68, 195-222. 
Schaubroeck, J., Ganster, D. C. and Jones, J. R. (1998). Organization and 
Occupational Influences in the Attraction-Selection-Attrition Process. Journal of 
Applied Psychology 83, 869-891. 
Schneider, B. (1987). The People Make the Place. Personnel Psychology 40, 437-453. 
Schneider, B., Goldstein, H. W. and Smith, D. B. (1995). The ASA Framework: An 
Update. Personnel Psychology 48, 747-773. 
Schneider, B., Smith, D.B., Taylor, S. and Fleenor, J. (1998). Personality and 
Organizations: A Test of the Homogeneity of Personality Hypothesis. Journal of 
Applied Psychology 83, 462-470. 
Sherif, M., Harvey, O., White, B., Hood, W. and Sherif, C. (1961). Intergroup 
Conflict and Cooperation: The Robber’s Cave Experiment. Norman OK: Institute 
of Group Relationships of the Univiversity of Oklahoma. 
 43
Sørensen, J. B. (1999a). The Ecology of Organizational Demography: Managerial 
Tenure Distributions and Organizational Competition. Industrial and Corporate 
Change 8, 713-745. 
Sørensen, J. B. (1999b). Executive Migration and Interorganizational Competition. 
Social Science Research 28, 289-315. 
Sorge, A. M. and Witteloostuijn, A. van (2004). The (Non)Sense of Organizational 
Change: An Essai about Universal Management Hypes, Sick Consultancy 
Metaphors and Healthy Organization Theories. Organization Studies 25, 1205-
1231.    
Staw, B. M., Sandelands, L. E. and Dutton, J. E. (1981). Threat-Rigidity Effects in 
Organizational Behavior: A Multi-Level Analysis. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 26, 501-524. 
Stinchcombe, A. (1997). On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism. Annual Review of 
Sociology 23, 1-18. 
Wegberg, M. J. A. M. van and Witteloostuijn, A. van. (2001). Strategic Management 
in the New Economy: Modern Information Technologies and Multichannel 
Contact Strategies. In J. A. C. Baum and H. R. Greve (Eds), Advances in Strategic 
Management: Multiunit Organization and Multimarket Strategy (pp. 265-306). 
Greenwich CT: JAI Press. 
Westphal, J. D. and Zajac, E. J. (1995). Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, 
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 40, 60-83. 
Wezel, F. C., Cattani, G. and Pennings, J. M. (2005). Competitive Implications of 
Inter-Firm Mobility. Working paper. Tilburg: Tilburg University. 
 44
Wiersema, M. F. (2002). Holes at the Top: Why CEO Firings Backfire. Harvard 
Business Review 80, 70-77.  
Wiersema, M. F. and Bantel, K. A. (1993). Top Management Team Turnover as an 
Adaptation Mechanism: The Role of the Environment. Strategic Management 
Journal 14, 485-505. 
Wiersema, M. F. and Moliterno, T. P. (2006). CEO Turnover in the New Era: A 
Dialogue with the Financial Community. In J. A. C. Baum, S. D. Dobrev and A. 
van Witteloostuijn (Eds), Strategy and Ecology: Advances in Strategic 
Management, 23 (pp. xx-xx). Oxford UK: JAI/Elsevier. 
Williams, K. Y. and O’Reilly, C. A. (1998). Demography and Diversity in 
Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research. In B. Staw and R. Sutton 
(Eds), Research in Organizational Behavior 20 (pp. 77-140). Greenwich CT: JAI 
Press. 
Witteloostuijn, A. van (2003) A Game-Theoretic Framework of Trust. International 
Studies of Management & Organization 33 (2), Part II, 53-71. 
Witteloostuijn, A. van and Boone, C. (2006). A Resource-Based Theory of Market 
Structure and Organizational Form. Academy of Management Review 
(forthcoming). 
Witteloostuijn, A. van and Wegberg, M. J. A. M. van (1992). Multimarket 
Competition: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 18, 273-282. 
Zajac, E. J. and Westphal, J. D. (1996). Who Shall Succeed? How CEO/Board 
Preferences and Power Affect the Choice of New CEOs. Academy of Management 




FIGURE 1: A process model of homosocial reproduction, competition and long-run organizational performance 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 Note that this role of network ties is assumed rather than estimated in the 
McPhersonian line of work. Indeed, Dobrev (2006) job-flocking’s argument suggests 
that “ecological ties of observability” may be enough. That is, even without direct 
social ties, career outcomes are affected by homophily in larger professional 
communities (such as top managers). 
2 Admittedly, McPherson and colleagues do not argue that preference and choice are 
not important. In fact, they (ex post) defend their choice to focus on voluntary 
associations because “they represent a unique arena for watching the strong interplay 
of structurally induced and choice-produced homophily” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & 
Cook, 2001: 432). Notwithstanding this disclaimer, these authors overwhelmingly 
focused on the structural sources of homophily. 
3 Interestingly, in the majority of recent sociological work on homophily researchers 
limit attention to ascriptive demographic characteristics such as gender and ethnicity. 
There is, however, no reason to exclude other individual characteristics from the 
analysis. Note, in fact, that most classical sociological treatments of homophily such 
as Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) did not restrict it to ascriptive characteristics 
(McPherson et al., 2001; Ruef et al., 2003). The bottom line for a purely homophilous 
mechanism to apply to both achieved and ascribed characteristics is that the functional 
contributions of those characteristics must be ruled out (Ruef et al., 2003: 196). That 
is, functional theories would suffice if group members are mainly selected based on 
the valuable and complementary competences they possess to ensure the success of 
the collectivity.  
4 Note that the set of reasons we offer for people’s preference for homogeneity do not 
necessarily imply conscious, deliberate choices that people make with respect to, for 
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instance, the recruitment of similar members in groups – on the contrary. As already 
suggested, these preferences are firmly rooted in human beings as they probably have 
evolutionary origins. Specifically, evolutionary theories of human cooperation, such 
as kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), trace 
the capacity of humans to behave cooperatively back to the evolutionary advantage 
resulting from fostering kin and from tit-for-tat behavior. What both theories have in 
common is that cooperation is expected to be more common among similar 
individuals, even if the underlying mechanisms are different. 
5 Yet another insight of Campbell (1994), related to Meyer’s (1994) argument, 
deserves further attention: executives as parasites. His argument is that the executives’ 
efforts to maximize their own fitness are likely to be at odds with the fitness of their 
firm. If so, we need to shift the level of analysis from firms to executives. In this 
paper, we developed a similar logic,  arguing that particularly homogeneous top 
management teams may be more interested in their own team fitness than in the 
fitness of their firms. Combining this with Campbell’s argument would imply that the 
likelihood of survival of a firm decreases with the homogeneity of its top management 
team. In their attempt to survive as a group, particularly if under threat, the executives 
as parasites will be involved in homosocial reproduction strategies that will negatively 
impact upon the survival chances of their host – i.e., the firm they are heading. In 
future work, we hope to test this hypothesis. 
6 This suggests a further refinement of the argument. Top management team 
homogeneity is positively associated with inertia, because ‘cloned’ executives share a 
preference for similar routines. Such inertia can be an advantage or a disadvantage, 
from the organization’s perspective. On the one hand, organizational ecology argues 
that such inertia is positively related with survival by providing a buffer against 
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changes that would harm the organization’s accountability, reliability and 
reproduceability, as well as its identity. On the other hand, this inertia may turn into a 
disadvantage in turbulent times, since than the stiffled routines may no longer fit with 
the new environmental conditions. So, it may be that top management team 
homogeneity is positively associated with the likelihood of organizational survival in 
stable environments, but negatively so in dynamic ones. Note that this hypothesis has 
already been explored in group research, providing evidence for the above logic 
(Boone et al., 2005). 
7 A similar logic might be applied at the population level (cf. Miner & Haunschild, 
1995; Miner & Anderson, 1999). Top management team reproduction may be either 
beneficial or harmful for the survival changes of the population as a whole by 
promoting organizational diversity, depending upon the nature of environmental 
change the population is facing. 
8 Interestingly, this implies that organizational diversity will be relatively low in 
populations where entry to a specific profession is highly regulated and 
institutionalized by, for instance, professional associations – a proposition consistent 
with institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In such 
cases, higher-order imitation and selection processes homogenize the pool of 
managerial talent that enters into an industry (for an example, see the Dutch audit 
industry: Maijoor & van Witteloostuijn, 1996; cf. Campbell, 1994). More broadly, 
homophily processes may occur at the level of the population as a whole, rather of the 
organization. In the current paper, we ignore this case. 
9 Both conditions are here taken to be exogenous. Of course, we could complicate the 
argument further by taking aboard endogeneity of this pair of conditions. For instance, 
clever top managers may be able to carve out new niches by creating new demand for 
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a novel product, or smart non-executives may decide to attract new types of 
executives from outside the current “population” of (potential) candidates. We leave 
these endogeneity issues for future work. 
10 Note that this finding only appears after controlling for multi-market contact among 
rivals. As predicted, multi-market contact decreases rivalry because the threat of 
competitive retaliation increases when competitors meet in several markets (van 
Witteloostuijn & van Wegberg, 1992; van Wegberg & van Witteloostuijn, 2001). This 
underscores Gimeno and Woo’s plea to disentangle crowding from multi-market 
contact effects.  
11 Unlike Proposition 2, this proposition is formulated at the level of the organization, 
and not at the dyad level. This is because the dependent variable is organizational 
performance. It is not very meaningful to use an absolute distance measure of 
performance between two firms as a criterion variable. 
12 Note that as interaction effects are symmetric, we also expect that specialist 
organizations (i.e., with a large strategic distance from competitors) will perform well 
especially when their top management teams are homogeneously composed. 
